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Microbes are intensely social organisms that routinely cooperate and coordinate their
activities to express elaborate population level phenotypes. Such coordination requires
a process of collective decision-making, in which individuals detect and collate information
not only from their physical environment, but also from their social environment, in order
to arrive at an appropriately calibrated response. Here, we present a conceptual overview
of collective decision-making as it applies to all group-living organisms; we introduce key
concepts and principles developed in the context of animal and human group decisions;
and we discuss, with appropriate examples, the applicability of each of these concepts in
microbial contexts. In particular, we discuss the roles of information pooling, control skew,
speed vs. accuracy trade-offs, local feedbacks, quorum thresholds, conﬂicts of interest,
and the reliability of social information. We conclude that collective decision-making in
microbes shares many features with collective decision-making in higher taxa, and we
call for greater integration between this ﬂedgling ﬁeld and other allied areas of research,
including in the humanities and the physical sciences.
Keywords: collective decision-making, microbes, cooperation, coordination, social information, phenotypic
plasticity, trade-offs, conflicts
COOPERATION, COORDINATION, AND SOCIAL INFORMATION
Microbes exhibit remarkably diverse and complex social behav-
iors. Individuals cooperate to form multicellular structures like
bioﬁlms (Nadell et al., 2009) and fruiting bodies (Velicer and Vos,
2009; Strassmann and Queller, 2011), to jointly scavenge resources
(Harrison and Buckling, 2009), to attack competitors (Riley and
Wertz, 2002; Cordero et al., 2012), to hunt in packs (Berleman
and Kirby, 2009), to defend themselves against predators (Jousset,
2012) or harsh environments (Davies, 2003) and to move together
across surfaces (Weijer, 2004; Kearns, 2010). From an evolution-
ary perspective, such behaviors can arise and be maintained only
when they provide net direct and/or indirect ﬁtness beneﬁts to
individuals (West et al., 2006). It follows then that such activities
will only be adaptive in certain environments and in certain social
contexts – in particular, when the response is coordinated across
individuals. Accordingly, we can identify at the proximate level two
key requirements for the evolution of collective behaviors. First,
there should be intrinsic phenotypic ﬂexibility in the behaviors of
individuals and groups in response to changing social and envi-
ronmental conditions and, second, theremust existmechanisms to
facilitate coordination among members of the collective. Empir-
ical work shows that microbes can indeed ﬂexibly and quickly
adjust their phenotypes in response to prevailing environmental
and social conditions (Kümmerli et al., 2009b) and most micro-
bial cooperative activities are indeed undertaken in a coordinated
manner (Jacob et al., 2004), and only when it is adaptive to do so
(Darch et al., 2012; Dumas et al., 2013). Such observations raise
important questions: how do simple brainless microbes, living as
they do in countless multitudes, achieve such impressive coordi-
nation? How do they integrate complex information and reconcile
potential conﬂicts of interest, to arrive at – and then enact – collec-
tive“decisions”? Althoughwehave only relatively recently begun to
consider these questions in amicrobial context, there exists already
a sizeable literature in the natural and social sciences on the gen-
eral topic of collective decision-making in animals and humans.
Here, we highlight some general concepts and results from this lit-
erature that are relevant to the study of collective decision-making
in microbes.
Before we continue, we need to clearly deﬁne what is meant
by “collective decision-making,” since, despite the large body of
literature on this subject, a standard deﬁnition is sadly lacking.
We deﬁne collective decision-making in its broadest sense as the
process by which a group of individuals uses social information
to arrive at a state of adaptive group-level coordination. By “social
information”wemean signals and/or cues generated by other indi-
viduals (Maynard Smith and Harper, 2003; Keller and Surette,
2006; Diggle et al., 2007a; Scott-Phillips, 2008), which could be
transmitted directly, or indeed indirectly (e.g., through traces left
in the environment; i.e., stigmergy). By“group-level coordination”
we mean anything other than a random distribution of individu-
als – or their behaviors – in space or time. It is important to note
that group-level coordination could involve either positive or neg-
ative correlations across individuals (Giuggioli et al., 2013). Either
pattern can potentially provide beneﬁts. Positive correlations of
individuals or their activities can lead to greater efﬁciency and syn-
ergy (Sumpter and Pratt, 2009), while negative correlations can
minimize mutually harmful or wasteful competition (Giuggioli
et al., 2013). Thus, geese ﬂying together in a V-formation (pos-
itive correlation in space and time), ﬁreﬂies spacing themselves
evenly in the undergrowth (negative correlation of individuals in
space), wolves howling in unison (positive correlation in time) and
meerkats taking turns to babysit their group’s pups (negative cor-
relation in time) all represent instances of adaptive coordination,
arrived at by some process of collective decision-making.
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So, coordination can be adaptive, and collective decision-
making uses social information to achieve this coordination. But
why use social information to achieve coordinated responses to
the environment? After all, patterns of correlation can also arise
when individuals respond only to environmental cues only. For
example, when phototrophic bacteria sense and swim along light
gradients, this can result in striking aggregationpatterns at the level
for the collective, yet social informationmay play little or no role in
the process (Taylor et al., 1999; Armitage and Hellingwerf, 2003).
Yet, there are important advantages to using social information.
First, compared to direct ﬁrst-hand information, social infor-
mation can potentially be acquired quicker and at lower cost.
For instance, individuals in groups that share social informa-
tion may detect a lurking predator earlier than would solitary
individuals (“many-eyes” hypothesis; Lima, 1995). Second, it
has long been appreciated that averaging over multiple inde-
pendent estimates can lead to a more accurate overall estimate
(e.g., “wisdom of the crowds”; Galton, 1907). Thus, individ-
uals with access to social information can potentially obtain a
more accurate picture of prevailing ecological conditions, and
such groups can realize more “accurate” collective decisions – i.e.,
outcomes that enhance the inclusive ﬁtness beneﬁts to all group
members.
CATEGORIZING COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
Collective decision-making can take many different forms. Build-
ing on the concept developed by West and Bergstrom (2011), we
propose that three axes delineate the main proximate features of
this diversity: (1) the scale over which decision-relevant informa-
tion is pooled prior to or during decision-making, (2) the degree
to which control over decisions is skewed within the group, and
(3) the degree to which there are conﬂicts of interest over the
decision outcome (Figure 1). The scale over which information
is pooled can vary from the global scale, where inputs from all
individuals in the group are integrated during decision-making,
down to the local scale, where integration of inputs occurs among
immediate neighbors only. Control over decisions, meanwhile,
can vary from centralized control, where, in the extreme case, a
single totalitarian leader determines group behavior, through to
completely distributed control (egalitarianism), where each indi-
vidual has an equal inﬂuence on the decision outcome. There is
an obvious interaction between the scale over which information
is pooled and the degree to which control over decision-making
is centralized: highly skewed decision-making is unlikely to be
stable unless decision makers have broad access to decision-
relevant information (Figure 1; West and Bergstrom, 2011). The
stability of decision-making processes is further inﬂuenced by
conﬂicts of interests among individuals. Along this axis, individ-
uals’ interests can vary from being in complete alignment (e.g.,
in clonal groups) to being diametrically opposed. In cases where
there are conﬂicts of interest, more egalitarian decision-making
and/or broader pooling of information both improve robust-
ness of collective decision-making. In addition, all three variables
can typically correlate with group size (King and Cowlishaw,
2007). Global information pooling is more easily achieved in small
groups, although sophisticated means of information sharing can
make it possible in larger groups too (e.g., humans; McGrath
FIGURE 1 | Categorization of different forms of collective
decision-making. Social settings can differ dramatically with respect to
how skewed control is, the scale over which information is pooled, and the
potential for conﬂicts of interests. Shading indicates the expected stability
of collective decision-making processes within this parameter space. (1)
Self-organization (examples: collective movements in bird ﬂocks, ﬁsh
shoals, ungulate herds, locust swarms; organization and division of labor in
social insects or bacterial bioﬁlms); (2) Democracy (examples: various
human groups, certain primate groups), (3) Informed autocracy (examples:
hierarchical animal societies, such meerkats or wolves; also certain primate
groupings, and human military organizations). (4) “Blind” autocracy (few
examples from natural systems; unlikely to remain stable over evolutionary
time).
and Hollingshead, 1993). Similarly, logistic constraints can make
it difﬁcult to maintain highly skewed control in large groups
(Reeve and Emlen, 2000), although multi-tier hierarchies go a
long way toward maintaining the skew (Reeve and Keller, 2001;
Summers, 2005). Finally, larger groups are also more likely to fea-
ture conﬂicts of interest (e.g., Conradt and Roper, 2007; Brückner,
2010).
Set against this framework, we would predict that decision-
making in microbes, which have limited cognitive abilities and
usually live in large groups, should be mainly characterized by
processes involving local informationpooling anddistributed con-
trol, while the level of conﬂict of interests would vary from low
(e.g., in clonal groups) to high (e.g., in mixed-species communi-
ties). In such self-organized decision-making, individuals monitor
(chemically) their immediate environment and the activities of
their close neighbors only, and respond according to simple innate
rules. Taken together, these local interactions can lead to impres-
sive self-organized patterns at the group level. So, what sort of
simple innate rules might individuals be following? Couzin et al.
(2002) provide an example, based on work by Reynolds (1987).
In computer simulations involving groups of continuously mov-
ing agents in 3D space, they show that just three rules, applied
at the level of individual agents, could lead to the emergence of
cohesive, directed patterns of movement at the group level. Specif-
ically, agents monitored three concentric zones centered on their
position. If a neighbor entered the outer “zone of attraction,”
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rule 1 stipulated that they would move toward it. If this neigh-
bor passed a second threshold to enter the “zone of orientation,”
under rule 2 they would align to its orientation. Finally, if the
neighbor entered the innermost “zone of repulsion,” rule 3 would
direct them to move away. Simple sets of rules such as these are
thought to underlie the complex collective movement patterns
observed in ﬁsh shoals (Couzin, 2009), bird ﬂocks (Ballerini et al.,
2008), and insects (Buhl et al., 2006). Microbial collective move-
ments too, could be mediated by similar rules, although of course
the sensory and cognitive processes would likely be rather differ-
ent from those of higher metazoans! Shklarsh et al. (2011) used the
above approach (Couzin et al., 2002) to model collective swarming
motility in a population of bacteria, and found that when individ-
uals adjusted their own motion in response to the movements of
nearby neighbors, this robustly improved navigation efﬁciency in
complex environments.
In the following sections, we discuss some general features
of collective decision-making processes. In each case, we illus-
trate concepts using appropriate examples, and we highlight their
prospective (or known) relevance in microbial contexts.
SPEED vs. ACCURACY
One key concept to emerge from the study of human and ani-
mal decision-making is that there is an intrinsic trade-off between
decision accuracy and decision speed (Schouten and Bekker, 1967;
Franks et al., 2003; Chittka et al., 2009). For maximal accuracy,
decision makers need reliable information on the likely beneﬁts
and costs of all potential alternatives. Obtaining this informa-
tion can potentially require personal sampling of different options,
and/or collating information passed on by fellow group members.
Thereafter, some sort of computation must be performed, and
ﬁnally, the decision must be enacted. All of this takes time, and
could involve substantial metabolic investment, risks, opportunity
costs, etc. Clearly, in some situations, such as impending danger, it
is more important that a decision is made quickly, than that it be
the “best” of all possible decisions. This speed-accuracy trade-off
applies at all stages and scales of decision-making, including collec-
tive decision-making. For example, consider the case of bee or ant
colonies choosing among prospective sites for relocation of their
communal nest. In cases requiring an urgent decision (e.g., when
bad weather is approaching and their current home is compro-
mised), their decision-makingprocess canbeﬁne-tuned tooperate
faster but less accurately (i.e., the colonymay fail to identify the best
option and instead may settle for a sub-optimal site). In contrast,
when the need to relocate is less pressing, the decision-making
process is slower but more accurate (Franks et al., 2003; Pratt and
Sumpter, 2006; Visscher, 2007). Note that to achieve maximal
accuracy, decision-making mechanisms also need to be ﬂexible.
In very changeable environments, what was at ﬁrst a great option
may quickly become a bad option, even while the decision-making
is still underway. The best-adapted decision-making processes
should therefore allow for some degree of bet-hedging, and also
be updatable and reversible (Seger and Brockmann, 1987). Only
in this way can groups identify and settle on the current optimal,
most accurate, decision. Usually, however, such ﬂexibility features
involve additional costs in terms of reduced speed or efﬁciency.
For example, ant colonies face collective decisions about how to
deploy their workforce so as to exploit known food sources as
quickly and efﬁciently as possible; yet, at the same time, they must
send out scouts to locate new food sources (Latty and Beekman,
2013).
Since different forms of collective decision-making (see
Figure 1) feature differing patterns of investment in infor-
mation gathering and integration, the resulting shape of this
speed-accuracy trade-off varies too across categories (Figure 2).
Comparison of these different trade-off functions indicates that
although democratic decision-making may lead to the fairest and
most accurate outcomes, more autocratic decision-making is an
intrinsically faster process, and so may be adaptive when quick
decisions are required.
Where extrinsic stresses are highly variable over time and space,
individuals and groups will also be under selection to be ﬂexible
in their collective decision-making, having the ability to transition
quickly between decision modes favoring high accuracy and those
favoring high speed. For example, under acute stress, individuals
could beneﬁt by temporarily downscaling their investment in the
acquisition and transmissionof new social information, and rather
just copy or conform to the decisions of better informed “leader”
individuals (Couzin et al., 2005; Dyer et al., 2009).
To our knowledge, the speed-accuracy trade-off in decision-
making has not received much attention in microbes, although
we would expect that it should still apply. Certainly, the col-
lective decisions achieved by clonal microbe groups do appear
to be impressively ﬂexible in response to environmental changes,
and this ﬂexibility has been interpreted as a form of bet-hedging
(Beaumont et al., 2009; Ratcliff and Denison, 2010; de Jong
et al., 2011; Levy et al., 2012). It is thought that such ﬂexi-
bility arises because individuals stochastically switch between
FIGURE 2 | Speed-accuracy trade-offs under different forms of
decision-making. Different forms of decision-making (1–5) are inherently
variable in terms of accuracy (or fairness). For the above illustration we
assume the pattern C > D > B > A > E with regard to accuracy. Moreover,
the different forms require relatively more or less time for (i) investigation of
available options; (ii) assimilation of social information, (iii) deliberation/
computation, and ﬁnally, (iv) implementation. Here, we assumed the
following time costs across decision-making forms A–E: for step
(i): 3,2,1,1,1; (ii): 0,1,3,3,0, (iii): 0, 3,1,1,0, and (iv): 1,1,2,2,2.
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alternating distinct responses (Kussell and Leibler, 2005). Social
information may indeed play a role here, but so far this role has
not been explicitly considered.
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEEDBACKS
In self-organized decision-making systems, local feedbacks are
very important (Sumpter, 2006). During the exchange of social
information among neighbors, positive feedbacks lead to ampliﬁ-
cation of transmitted signals, promoting their accumulation and
spread, while negative feedbacks dampen this accumulation and
spread of social information. In general, positive feedbacks speed
up decision-making, while the addition of negative feedbacks
confers ﬂexibility and hence allows for a more accurate response
(Figure 3). For instance, where groups must decide between dis-
crete alternatives, strong positive feedbacks could quickly drive
up support for the ﬁrst detected (but not necessarily the best)
option, while potentially better alternatives remain still undis-
covered (Grüter et al., 2012). By slowing the process, negative
feedbacks can help to avoid this suboptimal outcome. Also, where
two or more alternative options are attracting similar levels of sup-
port within a group, negative feedbacks can facilitate the relatively
steeper decay of support for less preferred options, and thus avoid
deadlocks. Finally, when deciding on some coordinated response
from a continuous range of possible alternatives (e.g., when to
leave; how much of a substance to produce), negative feedbacks
counterbalance positive feedbacks and so allow ﬁne-tuning of the
response. In each case then, positive and negative feedbacks work
together tomodulate the trade-off between the speed and accuracy
of the decision-making process. Tweaking the relative strengths of
these different feedbacks can thus shift a system towardprioritizing
either accuracy or speed (Franks et al., 2003; Pratt and Sumpter,
2006).
Feedbacks are well-established features of decision-making in
social insects andother arthropods (Hölldobler andWilson,1990).
For instance, foraging Pharaoh ants (Monomorium pharaonis) lay
pheromone trails when returning to their nest from remote food
sources (Beekman et al., 2001), and these trails help to direct addi-
tional foragers to the food in a positive feedback loop. Foragers
adjust their pheromone deposition (and thus feedback intensity)
in proportion to the quality of the food source (Jackson and Châ-
line, 2007), allowing the self-organized ants to collectively arrive
at a efﬁcient pattern of resource exploitation. Similar positive
FIGURE 3 | Feedbacks and quorum thresholds modulate the speed and
accuracy of collective decision-making. Here, groups are deciding
between two options. Red (dashed line) is the ﬁrst option to attract
support, but blue (solid line) is the more accurate choice (i.e., leads to
higher average ﬁtness). Lower quorum thresholds (dotted lines) make
decision-making faster, but increase the risk of suboptimal outcomes.
Positive feedbacks reinforce preferences and so accelerate
decision-making, but negative feedbacks provide ﬂexibility by avoiding
deadlocks and allowing suboptimal choices to gradually lose their appeal.
Note that here “quorum” is deﬁned as some critical threshold proportion
of decided individuals, above which a consensus decision is immediately
effected.
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feedbacks, involving silk draglines, facilitate group aggregation in
young spiders (Jeanson et al., 2004). To illustrate the interactions
between positive and negative feedbacks in collective decision-
making, let’s revisit the example of house-hunting bees mentioned
earlier. When colonies outgrow their nests, scouts set off to explore
new potential nest sites, and on their return, they communicate
their “observations” to other colony members via a special “wag-
gle dance,” in which the duration of the dance correlates with
the quality of the visited site. Other bees that perceive this infor-
mation are recruited to the same site, and in this way, a suitably
calibrated positive feedback loop is established (Seeley and Viss-
cher, 2004). However, when multiple similarly suitable sites are
available, there is a danger that positive feedbacks alone could lead
to a deadlock, such that none of the candidate sites emerges as
a clear winner. To avoid this, the decision-making process also
includes a negative feedback loop, whereby, in addition to recruit-
ing for the nest site they visited, scouts will also actively disturb
the waggle dances of other scouts returning from competing nest
sites (Seeley et al., 2011). The combined effect of positive and
negative feedbacks in this system means that scouts that visited
the most attractive site will recruit the most followers, and most
strongly inhibit the dancing of competing scouts, thereby direct-
ing consensus decision-making toward choosing the best available
nest.
Do such feedbacks also operate in bacteria? Certainly, many
bacterial traits, including collective traits, are subject to positive
feedbacks (Guespin-Michel and Kaufman, 2001; Smits et al., 2006;
Fujimoto and Sawai, 2013). A recent example comes from Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa bacteria during the early stages of bioﬁlm
formation (Zhao et al., 2013). When bacteria ﬁrst touch down on
a surface, they move about by secreting a ﬁlm of polysaccharide
(Psl) and then pulling themselves over this ﬁlm using type IV pili.
In the process, they leave a trail of Psl behind them, overwhich sub-
sequent cells can move more rapidly and more easily. This creates
a positive feedback effect and leads to local aggregations of cells
in much the same way as the pheromone trails and silk draglines
described in the arthropod examples above. Similar positive feed-
backs operate during the surface expansion of bioﬁlms, where cells
closest to the edge leave eDNA-lined furrows as they push out-
ward, which trailing cells then preferentially follow (Gloag et al.,
2013).
Negative feedbacks also feature inmicrobial collective activities.
Dumas et al. (2013) studied Pseudomonas aeruginosa’s decision to
invest in iron-scavenging siderophores as a function of environ-
mental iron availability. Siderophores are shared traits (i.e., public
goods) and as such represent a collective action that is most prof-
itable for producers when there is coordination at the group level
(Grifﬁn et al.,2004). Pseudomonas aeruginosa canproduce apotent
but expensive siderophore (pyoverdine) that is most beneﬁcial
in strictly iron-limited conditions, and/or a weaker but cheaper
siderophore (pyochelin) that is the more efﬁcient of the two under
less stringently iron-limited conditions. In either case, production
is subject to positive and negative local feedbacks (Visca et al.,
2007; Youard et al., 2011). Incoming iron-loaded siderophores
trigger production of more siderophores (Lamont et al., 2002;
Michel et al., 2007), and the strength of this positive feedback
correlates with the overall siderophore investment of the local
population. At the same time, as more and more iron is taken
up, negative feedbacks act to constrain siderophore production
(Leoni et al., 2000; Youard et al., 2011). The combination of social
information pooling, positive and negative feedbacks, and – in this
case – interactions between the two different sets of feedbacks reg-
ulating the two siderophores, allows bacteria to individually adjust
their overall siderophore “investment portfolio” to match prevail-
ing conditions. Consequently, at the group level, a coordinated
and adaptive siderophore investment strategy can be realized.
Feedback loops can also facilitate decisions that lead to divergent
patterns at the population level, and mediate division of labor.
For instance, the aggregation of starved Dictyostelium discoideum
amoebae is facilitated by a positive feedback loop operating on
cAMP secretion (Li and Purugganan, 2011), which establishes a
chemical gradient that individual amoebae follow, until a dense
aggregation is formed. Later, when the multicellular aggregate
commences fruiting body formation, the amoebae must collec-
tively decide how to divide themselves between the supporting
stalk and the spore it will bear. Prespore cells toward the front of
the aggregate produce a differentiation-inducing factor (DIF-1),
which triggers, on the local scale, differentiation of naïve cells into
prestalk cells. These prestalk cells, in turn, start to produce an
enzyme that cleaves DIF-1, thereby exerting a negative feedback
on the differentiation process. Collectively, these feedbacks ensure
that just the right number of cells is directed toward the stalk
fate.
THRESHOLDS, QUORUMS AND QUORUM SENSING
Quorums feature in many collective decision-making processes,
yet, it is important to note that the term “quorum” has come to
mean quite different things across different taxa and in different
decision contexts. In human groups, where the term was ﬁrst used,
a quorum is the minimum number of participants required at a
meeting before any ofﬁcially binding collective decisions can be
made (Sinclair, 1988). However, when groups of animals make
consensus decisions between discrete options, such as shelters, the
term “quorum” is used not for the minimum number of partici-
pants, but rather the minimum number of committed individuals
(i.e., “votes”) for a given option that will swiftly trigger concor-
dant behavior in the rest of the group (i.e., a “quorum response”;
Seeley and Visscher, 2004; Ward et al., 2008, 2012; Sempo et al.,
2009; Robinson et al., 2011). Consider, as an example, the house-
hunting bees example introduced earlier. If, upon arriving at a
prospective nest, scout bees detect that around 10–15 of their fel-
low scouts are simultaneously checking out the same site, then
on their return to the swarm, they will produce a speciﬁc pip-
ing signal that prompts the swarm to prepare for take-off (Seeley
andVisscher, 2004). Inmodels describing the collectivemovement
of self-propelling particles (e.g., ﬂocks of birds), meanwhile, we
encounter yet another type of threshold: the minimum number
of closest neighbors a focal individual must monitor in order to
be able to satisfactorily match its own movements to that of its
group (Ballerini et al., 2008). Although this particular threshold is
not termed a “quorum” (it is “topological distance”), it is certainly
a related concept. In microbes, the “quorum” in “quorum sens-
ing” phenomena translates neither to the number of participants
in a decision-making process, nor the number of individuals in
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favor of a particular decision, but rather to a threshold level of
stimulus beyond which a standard response is effected. The sig-
nals in microbial quorum sensing systems are small molecules,
secreted by cells in response to their local conditions, that dif-
fuse freely among cells and bind to intracellular receptors (Waters
and Bassler, 2005; Williams et al., 2007; Schuster et al., 2013). This
induces the production of additional signal molecules (positive
feedback), and, once the signal receptors are sufﬁciently stim-
ulated, a group-coordinated shift in gene-expression is induced
(Schuster et al., 2003). In general, the concentration of signal pro-
vides an index of population density, but since cells can vary in
the level of signal they produce, this relationship will likely be
non-linear in heterogeneous environments or where cells differ
in their response to their environment and/or to the social infor-
mation they receive (i.e., non-clonal populations). Despite this
important difference, the resulting outcomes of microbial quo-
rum sensing processes are still comparable, in a qualitative sense,
to the “quorum responses” observed in animal groups, in that in
both cases they allow behavior to be coordinated at the group
level. Accordingly, quorum sensing regulates many cooperative
traits that are only adaptive when expressed in a coordinated
manner and when the population is at high density, including
swarming, exoproduct secretion, and bioﬁlm formation (Nadal
Jimenez et al., 2012). One of the classic examples of quorum
sensing involves the marine bacterium Vibrio ﬁscheri which sym-
biotically colonizes a specialized light organ of the bobtail squid
Euprymna scolopes (Ruby, 1996). As it grows to high density in
the shelter of the light organ, V. ﬁscheri synthesizes (using its
LuxI protein) and secretes signal molecules [acyl homoserine lac-
tones (AHLs)], which diffuse among cells and eventually bind
to their cognate receptor (LuxR). LuxR ligation stimulates fur-
ther AHL production (positive feedback) but if no AHL binding
takes place, the LuxR protein quickly degrades (negative feed-
back). When a threshold concentration of LuxR–AHL complex
is reached – which, because of the diffusion of AHLs, occurs
at roughly the same time in all cells – the luciferase operon
is activated and light is produced, in a synchronized manner,
by the entire bacterial collective. The light compensates for the
squid’s shadow, camouﬂaging it against the moonlit sky and hid-
ing it – and its bacterial symbionts – from predators in the depths
below.
Thresholds can of course also be important in systems that
do not employ “recognized” quorum sensing signals like AHLs.
For instance, consider the bacterium Paenibacillus dendritiformis,
which when growing on agar surfaces swarms out to form elab-
orate fringing colonies that end abruptly at the frontier with
another colony, maintaining a well-deﬁned no-man’s land sep-
arating the colonies. Be’er et al. (2009, 2010), seeking to explain
this group-level coordination, uncovered a relatively simple mech-
anism operating at a local scale. Metabolically active cells along
the colony’s expanding front secrete a protease (subtilisin), which
accumulates locally. So long as the colony is expanding outward
into virgin territory, subtilisin remains diluted across space. How-
ever, upon encountering another conspeciﬁc “front,” subtilisin
concentrations in the contact zone can build up until a critical level
is exceeded, which triggers the localized production and secretion
of a bacteriocin (sibling lethal factor (Slf)], that kills cells on both
fronts. Consequently, an open zone of inhibition is maintained
between the colony fronts. This mechanism is thought to mediate
competition over space and resources in a way that is beneﬁcial at
the level of the collective.
From the above examples, it becomes clear that microbial quo-
rum sensing systems involve far more than just a quorum. In
fact, they involve multiple features of collective decision-making
that we have highlighted in this review. First, the diffusion of sig-
nals facilitates broad pooling of information. In effect, this moves
us along the axis from local to more global information pooling
(Figure 1). By averaging across multiple potentially noisy infor-
mational inputs, decisionmakers (in this case, individual cells) can
build up a richer and more accurate impression of their surround-
ings and their neighbors (Simons, 2004), and thus arrive at more
accurate, more egalitarian, outcomes. Quorum sensing systems
also involve an intrinsic response threshold, and – typically – some
local feedbacks. Both the response threshold and the feedbacks can
be altered, over the short term via phenotypic plasticity, or over the
long term via selection, to shift decision-making toward greater
speed or greater accuracy (Figure 3), to maximize adaptiveness
under prevailing conditions (Pratt and Sumpter, 2006). Indeed,
when the quorum sensing signal threshold was experimentally
lowered in a recent study, and a premature collective response was
induced, a ﬁtness drop was observed at the level of the population
(Darch et al., 2012).
Although it is nowwell established that quorumsensing systems
provide important beneﬁts through facilitation of cooperative
behaviors (West et al., 2012), it is also important to note that
they may also provide beneﬁts in non-social settings. For instance,
by secreting and monitoring their own signal molecules, individ-
ual cells could potentially acquire information about the diffusive
properties of their local environment and adjust their own activi-
ties accordingly (Redﬁeld, 2002; Hense et al., 2007). Also, some cell
products under quorum sensing regulatory control provide little
if any beneﬁt to cells other than the producer (Dandekar et al.,
2012). More generally then, we may expect to see that mech-
anisms facilitating collective decision-making could play other
roles too.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Conﬂicts of interest among individuals will generally destabilize
cooperative activities and the collective decision-making processes
that facilitate them (as illustrated by the vertical axis in Figure 1),
but this destabilization depends on the magnitude of the conﬂict,
i.e., the potential ﬁtness advantage an individual could obtain by
acting independently (selﬁshly) vs. coordinating its activity with
others (cooperatively). For instance, imagine there is some the-
oretical level of exoenzyme production that would maximize the
ﬁnal yield of a population of bacteria collectively exploiting a sub-
strate. In principle, bacterial cells could monitor the output of
their neighbors, and each could adjust its individual contribution
so that the total amount of exoenzyme produced is close to the
theoretical optimum, and the costs of producing this required
amount are more or less evenly borne by all constituent cells
in the population. However, now imagine that within the pop-
ulation, mutants arise that do not coordinate production with
others, but rather down-regulate their own contribution to the
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exoenzyme pool. This lineage would bear a lower cost, and hence
should gradually come to occupy a larger proportion of the popu-
lation. Under this scenario, there could be substantial differences
in ﬁtness between individuals contributing their fair share vs.
those contributing less than a fair share, so the pattern of coor-
dinated behavior and the decision-making process by which it is
achieved would both be quickly undermined by the emergence
of free-loading cheats (Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000; Ghoul et al.,
2013). Indeed, cheats are frequently observed in numerous micro-
bial cooperative traits, including the shared production of food
enzymes (Greig and Travisano, 2004), siderophores (Grifﬁn et al.,
2004; Dumas and Kümmerli, 2012), and toxins (Raymond et al.,
2012), and also during the formation of multicellular structures
like bioﬁlms (Rainey and Rainey, 2003; Popat et al., 2012), and
fruiting bodies (Strassmann et al., 2000; Velicer et al., 2000).
To avoid conﬂicts and maintain collective actions, the interests
of group members must be brought into alignment. In gen-
eral terms, this can be achieved by (a) increasing relatedness,
(b) disincentivizing cheating by introducing costs for potential
dissenters, or (c) incentivizing cooperation by increasing the
beneﬁts associated with cooperation (Hamilton, 1964; Frank,
2003).
(a) Clonal groups have wholly overlapping evolutionary
interests, whereas individuals of different strains or species
that do not share the same genotype frequently have diverg-
ing interests (Foster and Bell, 2012; Rendueles and Ghigo,
2012). Accordingly, experimental work conﬁrms that related-
ness is a key promoter of microbial collective actions (food
enzymes: MacLean and Brandon, 2008; siderophores: Kümmerli
et al., 2009a; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2009; toxins: Inglis et al., 2009;
quorum sensing controlled traits: Diggle et al., 2007b; swarm-
ing motility: de Vargas Roditi et al., 2013; bioﬁlm formation:
Nadell and Bassler, 2011; and fruiting body formation: Gilbert
et al., 2007). Nonetheless, natural microbial communities typically
involve interactions among individuals that vary widely in their
relatedness to one another (e.g., bioﬁlms; Elias and Banin, 2012;
Rendueles and Ghigo, 2012) so conﬂicts of interests are expected
to be commonplace in such communities (Xavier and Foster,
2007).
(b) Mechanisms to disincentivize dissention (i.e., repress com-
petition) can take different forms. For essential traits, negative-
frequency-dependent selection intrinsically limits the spread
of cheats, because at high cheat loads collective actions can
collapse – to the detriment of all. Examples here include the collec-
tive production of siderophores (Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007), toxins
(Raymond et al., 2012), and food enzymes (Gore et al., 2009), as
well as fruiting body formation in bacteria (Velicer et al., 2000)
and amoeba (Gilbert et al., 2007). In other cases, speciﬁc fea-
tures of the genetic architecture prevent dissention. For example,
genes encoding cooperative traits could also pleiotropically inﬂu-
ence important personal traits, such that mutants for these genes
would not have a net advantage (Foster et al., 2004; Dandekar et al.,
2012). Sophisticated regulatory circuits, meanwhile, can ensure
that cooperative traits are preferentially expressed when cheat-
ing opportunity is low (Kümmerli and Brown, 2010; Xavier et al.,
2011). Finally, alignment of interests can also be enforced through
mechanisms that sanction or punish cheating individuals (Kiers
et al., 2003; Manhes and Velicer, 2011), reward faithful partners
(Kiers et al., 2011), or randomize the reproductive success across
group members (Kümmerli et al., 2010; Strassmann and Queller,
2011).
(c) Another way in which interests of individuals become
aligned is where group coordination leads to massive beneﬁts
for everyone. For example, consider a ﬂock of birds migrating
from A to B. Although individual birds may have different pref-
erences regarding the timing of the migration or which speciﬁc
route to take (e.g., depending on their speciﬁc size or age, fat
reserves, experience, etc.) it is nonetheless important that the
birds stay together during their migration so as to beneﬁt from
the gains in energy efﬁciency that can come from slip-streaming
behind one another during formation ﬂight. Here, it doesn’t pay
for individuals to obdurately pursue their individual optima, so
the decision-making process should be more robust. Note, in this
example – birds choosing a migration route – it also doesn’t pay
for each individual bird to exhaustively assess all its alternative
migration options. Considering the ﬁtness payouts at stake here,
compromising and simply following others could represent the
most rewarding strategy (e.g., Biro et al., 2006; Nagy et al., 2010).
Similarly, when individual D. discoideum amoebae aggregate in
response to starvation, their resultant group-coordinated motility
allows everyone to escape hostile conditions (Li and Purugganan,
2011), so there is little evolutionary incentive not to participate, at
least in this part of the process.
Besides destabilizing cooperative actions, and the collective
decision-making processes that underlie them, conﬂicts of interest
can also inﬂuence selection for different formsof decision-making.
When conﬂicts are relatively minor, and where information can be
pooled fairly broadly (e.g., small groups) it is easy to see how lead-
ers could emerge – typically from among those individuals for
whom different decision outcomes would have strongest effects
on ﬁtness – and how a initially democratic decision process could
transition into a more autocratic one (Figure 1). Where more
substantial conﬂicts of interest exist, meanwhile, democratic sys-
tems of collective decision-making should be the most robust,
since these give rise to the most accurate decisions (i.e., best-ﬁt
compromise across all individuals; Figure 2). Conradt and Roper
(2010) emphasize that it can be more difﬁcult for groups to reach
consensus when deciding between discrete options (since some
individualsmustwholly abandon their preferred choice,while oth-
ers will have exactly their preferred choice) than it is for decisions
among continuously distributed options (where the consensus can
be achieved by simply averaging across preferences) since the latter
will generally produce a lower variance between preferred options
and ﬁnal consensus choice. Consequently, conﬂicts of interest
may remain inherently higher in the ﬁrst case (making demo-
cratic decision-making preferable here), than in the second case
(where autocratic decisions could more easily evolve). Thus, con-
ﬂicts of interest can affect decision-makingnot only in quantitative
ways, by making it less robust, but also in qualitative ways too, by
selecting for different forms.
RELIABILITY OF SOCIAL INFORMATION
Incorporating social information into decision-making processes
is only adaptive when the incoming information is reliable
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(Condorcet, 1785; List, 2004). However, individuals will inevitably
differ one from another in their detection and responsiveness to
such stimuli. Consequently, the amount and reliability of social
information will vary across a group. Where some individuals
are better informed than others, or are known to transfer this
information with greater ﬁdelity, it could be better for all that
the decision be made on the basis of their information only, and
that the signals and cues from naïve or unreliable individuals be
ignored (Reebs, 2000; King and Cowlishaw, 2007; Katsikopoulos
and King, 2010). In effect, segregation into informed “leaders”
and uninformed “followers” could facilitate a division of labor,
with potential gains in efﬁciency at the group level. Accord-
ingly, when bees are deciding on and relocating to a new nest
site, only information from informed scouts who have ﬁrst hand
experience of prospective sites is considered (Britton et al., 2002;
Beekman et al., 2006).
In cases with conﬂict of interest, there is an evolutionary incen-
tive for individuals to distort collective decision-making toward
more personally favorable outcomes, and one way to achieve
this could be by supplying false or inaccurate information. The
evolutionary dynamics of such “dishonest signaling” have been
extensively investigated by theoreticians (e.g., Maynard Smith and
Harper, 2003; Scott-Phillips, 2008) and could, it is thought, be
relevant to microbes. For instance, although inter-individual het-
erogeneity in producing or responding to quorum sensing signal
is typically interpreted as a sort of division of labor that con-
fers group level beneﬁts (e.g., Anetzberger et al., 2009, 2012),
it may be that in some cases what we are observing is in fact
cheating or coercion, whereby individuals chemically manip-
ulate quorum sensing-based collective decisions to their own
advantage, and beneﬁt at the expense of the group (Keller and
Surette, 2006; Diggle et al., 2007a; Stacy et al., 2012). Both sce-
narios are plausible, and to disentangle them we should study
ﬁtness consequences at the individual and group level. Certainly,
signal-blind quorum sensing mutants are known to arise in nat-
ural settings (e.g., the cystic ﬁbrosis lung; Köhler et al., 2009),
and in vitro experiments suggest that these mutants may be
acting as cheats (Diggle et al., 2007b). As another example, dur-
ing the formation of D. discoideum fruiting bodies mentioned
earlier, aggregates of amoebae differentiate into prestalk and pre-
spore subpopulations, but some mutants are able to skew the
decision-making process so that they end up over-represented
in the prespore region of the aggregate, thereby displacing wild-
type amoebae to the prestalk region instead (Santorelli et al.,
2008).
OUTLOOK
In this article, we have sought to highlight how some general
concepts emerging from the study of collective decision-making
in animals and humans can aid in understanding how microbes
use social information to coordinate their collective behaviors.
We show that microbial collective decision-making shares much
in common with collective decision-making in higher taxa, but
of course there are some obvious differences too. For exam-
ple, the typically very large population sizes in microbes could
favor mostly distributed decision-making processes as opposed
to centralized control. Also, information exchange in microbes
is overwhelmingly chemical in nature, whereas in more complex
metazoans it may be audial, visual or tactile, etc.
Currently, there is little sign of “cross-talk” about collec-
tive decision-making at the microscopic vs. macroscopic scales
(although, of course, there are some exceptions, e.g., Weitz et al.,
2008; Zeng et al., 2010; Fujimoto and Sawai, 2013; Norman et al.,
2013), and it is our hope that this will soon change. In fact, collec-
tive decision-making is a phenomenon of even broader relevance.
Indeed, collective decision-making mechanisms – featuring local-
scale signaling, feedbacks and thresholds – underlie group level
organization and coordination not only in humans, animals, and
microbial populations (Sumpter, 2006; Conradt and List, 2009;
this review), but in many other contexts too. For instance, within
the developing tissues of multicellular eukaryotes, a “community
effect” facilitates en-masse differentiation of cells upon attainment
of some threshold density (Gurdon et al., 1993; Balázsi et al., 2011;
Saka et al., 2011). Collective decision-making mechanisms are rel-
evant also in robotics (Garnier, 2011), in cognitive neuroscience
(Couzin, 2009; Marshall et al., 2009; Seeley et al., 2011), and in
many other contexts, attracting attention from political scientists,
economists, ethologists, physicists,mathematicians, computer sci-
entists, neurologists, and urban planners. Clearly, there is scope
for much broader dialog on this topic.
In amicrobial context, there is still much to be discovered about
the mechanisms underlying collective decision-making. While
it is clear that microbes share social information and use feed-
backs and quorum thresholds to optimize and coordinate social
behaviors, other aspects of their collective decision-making are
less well explored. For instance, to our knowledge, the speed
vs. accuracy tradeoff in collective decision-making has not been
explicitly investigated in microbes, although a recent study by
Darch et al. (2012) could potentially be interpreted along these
lines. Furthermore, while empirical work on human and ani-
mal decision-making typically involves monitoring individuals’
behaviors through space and time,microbial experiments typically
focus only on behavioral shifts at the population level (although
see Gloag et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2013). For a more complete
understanding, microbiologists will need to fully embrace inter-
individual variability within these populations – and ideally over
short time scales. Thankfully, however, modern technological
advances in microﬂuidics and time-lapse microscopy are mak-
ing this more feasible (Wessel et al., 2013). In other respects,
microbes already offer advantages that animals and humans
do not. In particular, we can strictly control the conditions
to which microbes are exposed, and we can decode in great
detail – and manipulate – the molecular pathways involved in
decision-making.
So, what sort of experiments do we think would be most
helpful in advancing our understanding of microbial collective
decision-making? Let’s consider a hypothetical example. As dis-
cussed earlier, it is expected that decision accuracy should improve
when information can be pooled across multiple inputs (Sumpter
et al., 2008; Ward et al., 2011). One way to test this could be
with choice experiments, where, in the simplest scenario, indi-
viduals or groups of bacteria are placed in an agar-lined Y-maze
and must decide between two nearby alternatives: food or no
food. Would larger bacterial aggregates be more likely to swarm
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in the direction of food sources than smaller groups? Would
they “decide” earlier? Would the level of starvation (i.e., the
urgency for a collective action) affect the accuracy vs. speed of
the decision?
While we do certainly advocate a more interdisciplinary and
integrative approach to the study of collective decision-making,
at the same time, we urge caution. Social evolution theory has
been famously dogged by semantic confusion and controversies
(Lehmann and Keller, 2006; West et al., 2007; Nowak et al., 2010;
Abbot et al., 2011), and it would be most unfortunate if the same
difﬁculties recurred in this emerging ﬁeld. The use of clearly
deﬁned terminology, and a willingness to engage meaningfully
with the work – past and present – from other allied disciplines
will be key to the development of general theory for collective
decision-making in all its forms.
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